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Abstract
Jurors’ Perceptions of False Confessions
Madison G. Gallimore
This study examined the effect of mock jurors’ perceptions of a defendant’s false confession vs.
no confession (false confession presence), coercive interrogation techniques vs. panic-escape
(false confession reason), and expert witness testimony vs. defendant explanation vs. expert
witness testimony plus defendant explanation for his false confession (source). The four
hypotheses and one research question pertained to main effects and interaction effects of false
confession presence, false confession reason, and source (separately) and expert witness
conditions combined on five outcome variables. Outcome variables were defendant’s guilt,
trustworthiness, suggestibility, susceptibility to external influences, and juror’s likelihood of
changing their verdict. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), mock jurors (N = 415) were
randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions, in which they read a murder trial scenario and
answered questions regarding the outcome variables. Main effects of false confession were found
within the defendant’s perceived guilt, trustworthiness, and suggestibility. Main effects of source
were also found, such that the defendant’s perceived guilt, suggestibility, and susceptibility to
external influences were significant, as was to jurors’ likelihood of changing their verdict
(guilty/not guilty) but follow-up analyses yielded an inconsistent pattern. Expert witness
testimony reduced perceptions of guilt and suggestibility, and decreased jurors’ openness to
changing their verdict. Numerous False Confession x Reason interactions emerged pertaining to
the defendant’s perceived guilt, trustworthiness, and suggestibility, as well as the jurors’
likelihood of changing their verdict (guilty/not guilty). A series of planned contrasts comparing
the false confession/coercive interrogation/expert witness vs. the false confession/panic-
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escape/expert witness conditions; the false confession/coercive interrogation/defendant vs. false
confession/panic-escape/defendant condition; and the false confession/coercive
interrogation/expert witness + defendant vs. false confession/panic-escape/expert witness +
defendant showed no significant differences in jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt.
Keywords: jurors’ perceptions, false confessions
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Introduction
The use of DNA evidence has become the gold standard for determining who committed
a crime (West & Meterko, 2016). If the DNA collected from a crime scene does not match the
suspect who confessed, the confession is often deemed false (Lynch, 2008). It is unknown how
many people have been wrongfully convicted due to false confessions. However, in 27% of all
cases exonerated through DNA evidence a false confession was given (West & Meterko, 2016).
Several studies have examined the methods that jurors perceive to lead to false
confessions. A survey was administered to 116 jury eligible participants to determine their
beliefs about false confessions (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). Henkel et al. (2008) found
that interrogation characteristics, such as torture, were reported to be the most likely to increase
false confessions. Other coercive interrogation techniques, such as lengthy interrogations lasting
for multiple hours, minimization (i.e., decreasing the seriousness of the crime), maximization
(i.e., increasing the seriousness of the crime), and pretending to befriend the suspect (e.g.,
interrogator pretends to care about the suspect to get the suspect to open up about the crime)
were rated moderate to high in how often they are thought to be used by interrogators. Suspects
who are young, have intellectual deficits, and have been diagnosed with a mental illness were
thought to be more susceptible to giving a false confession. However, participants also reported
that confessions are a strong sign of guilt and believed that they themselves would not falsely
confess to a crime.
In a second investigation, Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer, and Vinson (2010) had all
participants (461 jury eligible people identified by census data) first answer fifteen questions on
a ten-point Likert-type scale. Questions included the ability to distinguish between true and false
confessions (e.g., “Interrogators’ ability to detect lies improves with experience”) which was
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endorsed by 60% of jurors (Costanzo et al., 2010, p. 239). Other beliefs about false confessions
included “If interrogated, I would falsely confess to a serious crime” (agreed with by 3.9% of
jurors), and the rates of false confessions, “What percentage of confessions in murder cases are
false?” (jurors reported 22.3%) (Costanzo et al., 2010, p. 239). The use of minimization and
expert witness testimony were supported by jurors (24% and 67%, respectively) (Costanzo et al.,
2010). However, most of the participants did not approve of interrogators lying to suspects about
polygraphs, DNA, or non-existent eyewitnesses, nor did jurors view threats or promises of
leniency as permissible (Costanzo et al., 2010).
An experimental study demonstrated that both true and false confessions are believed
more often than not (88% of the time) by individuals who are jury eligible (Levin, Kim, & Blair,
2010). Participants also erroneously believed that people can distinguish between true and false
confessions and had confidence in their ability to do so (Honts, Kassin, & Craig, 2014; Kassin,
Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). Therefore, an important area of study is how false confessions
actually come to be elicited by interrogators.
Factors Affecting the Elicitation of a False Confession
Individual Characteristics, Bodily States, and False Confessions
Drizin and Leo (2005) collected data from 125 real false confessions in which people
often falsely confessed to a murder. Of those false confessions that went to criminal trial, 86% of
people were convicted. Thirty percent of false confessors were 25-to-39-years-old, and 27
percent of false confessors were 18-to-24-years-old. Interrogations were often lengthy, with 39%
lasting 12-24 hours and 34% lasting 6-12 hours. Factors increasing susceptibility to falsely
confessing are as follows: the presence of two or more interrogators; lengthy interrogations; use
of deception and individual characteristics (i.e., being young in age; being trusting; having a poor
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memory; being submissive; having low self-control; being of limited intelligence; having a
developmental disability; and having a mental illness, including but not limited to, ADHD,
antisocial personality disorder, and having an anxious predisposition) (Conti, 1999; Gudjonsson,
1990; Gudjonsson et al., 2012; Kassin, 2010; Klaver, 2008). Being innocent is another risk factor
given that wrongly convicted false confessors have reported thinking that the evidence would
clear them and so there was no harm in telling investigators what they wanted to hear to end the
interrogation (Kassin, 2010). Bodily states, such as sleep deprivation have been shown to affect
the decisions that people make, including the decision to provide a false confession (Frenda,
Berkowitz, Loftus, & Fenn, 2015).
In addition to individual characteristics and bodily states, certain interrogation techniques
can increase the likelihood of a false confession. These will now be discussed.
Interrogation Techniques and False Confessions
Various techniques are used by interrogators during police interviews to obtain a
confession (Perillo & Kassin, 2010). A specific strategy is bluffing (i.e., deceiving suspects by
hinting that incriminating evidence can be or has been obtained). False evidence may make the
interviewee think that their fate is sealed so the best that they can hope for is leniency if they
confess (Kassin, 2010).
Perillo and Kassin (2010) examined whether using a bluff increases the rates of false
confessions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, which varied in the
confederate’s statement in the presence of the participant and the inclusion of a bluff statement
(i.e., interrogator could prove the participant’s guilt by reviewing the participant’s keystrokes).
Each condition and the confession rate will now be reviewed. There was a confederate who
either said that they saw the participant press the ALT key (Condition 1, 78.6%), did not see the
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participant press the ALT key (Condition 2, 35.7%), or were unsure as to whether the participant
pressed the ALT key (i.e., control group Condition 3, 26.7%). In Condition 4 (86.7%), the
interrogator used a bluff on its own to verbally indicate that he could prove the participant’s guilt
by reviewing the participant’s keystrokes. In Condition 5 (79.9%), the interrogator used the same
bluff as Condition 4 plus the confederate reported that they saw the participant press the ALT
key. These results show that using the bluff technique (Conditions 4 and 5) greatly increased
people’s likelihood of falsely confessing.
Perillo and Kassin (2010) completed a second study in which they randomly assigned
participants to either a bluff technique only or control condition to determine the effect of a bluff
on its own. The computer crash paradigm was used again, but those who confessed were
interviewed afterward to collect data on why they confessed and if they believed that they were
guilty. In the bluff condition, 74% falsely confessed, compared to 47% in the control condition.
Of those who confessed in the bluff condition, 75% reported that they confessed because of the
deception.
In a third study, a second scenario was developed based on a similar paradigm (Russano,
et al., 2005) that included a control group to determine if a similar rate of false confessions
would occur as with the original cheating paradigm. Fifty percent of those who experienced the
bluff technique confessed, whereas no one in the no-bluff control group confessed. This
percentage was consistent with the experimental condition’s rate in the second study (57.9%), as
opposed to the even higher rates of confession in the first study.
In summary, in two of the three previously described studies, bluff techniques elicited
confessions from participants approximately 50% of the time (Perillo & Kassin, 2005, 2010).
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Minimization (i.e., downplaying the crime that was committed), is another common
technique used by interrogators to get suspects to confess. In addition, deals are often offered to
persuade suspects to confess based on the possibility of obtaining a lighter punishment. Despite
their frequency, critics doubt their coercive influence in the lab, due to participants not having
anything at stake (Russano, et al., 2005).
Russano et al. (2005) used a 2 (guilty vs. innocent) x 2 (minimization vs. no
minimization) x 2 (deal vs. no deal) design to examine whether differences exist between true
and false confessions when coercive interrogation techniques are used. A participant and
confederate were left alone in a room after being told to answer questions without working
together. In the guilty condition, the confederate asked the participant for help on an individual
item, but in the innocent condition, the confederate did not ask for help. Guilty condition
participants made their own decision about whether or not to help the confederate. Participants
were accused by the interrogator of working with another person based on getting the same
questions wrong as the confederate. The interrogator used minimizing phrases such as “I’m sure
you didn’t realize what a big deal it was” (Russano et al., 2005, p. 483). If the participant did not
take the deal, they would not receive their research credit and would have to face another
unknown consequence. If the participant refused or seemed hesitant, the interrogator repeated the
interrogation techniques specific to the experimental condition until the confession was signed or
3 more times. False confessions ranged from 6% with no interrogation tactic, to 14% when a deal
was offered, to 18% when minimization was used, to 43% when a deal plus minimization was
used.
Using a similar paradigm as above, Narchet, Meissner, and Russano (2011) designed a
study to see if interrogators’ guilt biases would increase the rates of false confessions.
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Interrogator bias regarding the suspect’s guilt was manipulated within the study via another
researcher making comments to the interrogator about the defendant’s guilt (i.e., they cheated by
obtaining help from the confederate on a questionnaire that they were told to fill out themselves).
The biasing researcher stated that the suspect was guilty, innocent, or that they were unsure of
the suspect’s guilt (i.e., control group). The bias manipulation occurred after the experimenter
collected the questionnaires, at which time they became interrogators. Interrogators used any of
the minimization or maximization techniques that they learned during their 5-week training to
obtain a true confession. Participants were interrogated for up to 15 minutes and then asked one
time to sign a confession at the end of the interrogation. If the participant refused to sign the
confession, they were informed that the interrogator would have to call the principal investigator
to determine how to proceed. False confessions were lowest (20%) when the interrogator had no
bias, but rose to 26% under innocent bias, and increased to 47% when the interrogator thought
that the participant was guilty. Participant false confession rates increased with the use of
interrogation tactics. The false confession base rate was 3% when no techniques were used,
followed by 11% when maximization was used, 22% when minimization was used, and 43%
when minimization plus maximization were used.
To summarize, bluffs, false evidence, minimization, maximization, and offering a deal
are interrogation techniques that are often used by interrogators and their frequency increases
when an interrogator believes that the suspect is guilty (Narchet, et al., 2011). This is a problem
because these interrogation techniques have been shown to increase the likelihood of confessions
due to pressure on the suspect to confess (Perillo & Kassin, 2010; Russano et al. 2005; Narchet,
et al. 2011).
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Although data shows that particular interrogation techniques increase the likelihood of a
false confession, it is also important to examine the way that jurors perceive these techniques.
Jurors’ Perceptions of Confession Eliciting Techniques
As discussed, confessions are an influential piece of evidence for jurors in a criminal
trial. Researchers (Kassin & Sukel, 1997) were interested in the weight that a confession can
have on a determination of guilt. Participants were given a transcript of a murder trial with
circumstantial evidence and a confession. The suspect within the low-pressure interrogation
blurted out their confession despite no coercive interviewing techniques being used by the
interrogator. The high-pressure interrogation consisted of an interrogator flaunting a weapon and
making the suspect physically uncomfortable via handcuffs. In the admissible condition, the
judge ruled that the confession could be used as evidence, compared to the inadmissible
condition in which the jurors learned of a confession, but the judge ruled that the confession was
inadmissible. A confession may be inadmissible if its reliability is questionable. An inadmissible
condition was added to determine whether jurors who were instructed to disregard a confession
are able to do so when deciding upon a verdict on guilt. The confession was elicited under either
a low-or high-pressure interrogation and the confession was either admissible or inadmissible in
court. A no confession control group was compared to the 4 experimental conditions. Jurors were
asked to rate whether they thought that the confession was voluntary, to decide on a verdict on
guilt, to rate their confidence in that verdict, and to indicate whether or not they thought the
confession influenced their verdict. Jurors rated the confession as more voluntary when it
occurred under low pressure circumstances compared to high pressure circumstances. However,
conviction rates between the high- and low-pressure interrogation conditions did not
significantly differ. These findings highlight the incongruence between jurors’ beliefs that
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interrogation techniques can be coercive, and their decisions regarding guilt when a confession
exists. However, jurors may perceive interrogation techniques and confession evidence
differently when an expert witness testifies.
Jurors’ Perceptions of Expert Witness Testimony in False Confession Cases
An experimental study by Blandón-Gitlin, Sperry, and Leo (2009) examined whether
expert witness testimony would help jurors evaluate a criminal case. Within this study, the
murder trial transcript was divided into two parts, pre-and post-expert testimony. Jurors read a
summary of the events from the defendant being interrogated (e.g., after a night of not sleeping
or eating), being persuaded to take a polygraph test, and retracting his confession shortly after
giving it. Jurors were then given a questionnaire for the first time in the repeated-measures
design to assess juror outcome variables (e.g., ratings of the coerciveness of interrogation
techniques and their verdict regarding the defendant’s guilt). Jurors then read the second part of
the trial transcript. The expert witness testified about research on common coercive interrogation
strategies including maximization, minimization, bluffing and false evidence. The expert then
pointed out interrogation techniques that were concerning from the interrogation in question and
that the use of these techniques could have led to a false confession. Jurors were then given
another questionnaire, with some of the same questions as before. Higher rates of coercion were
reported for all interrogation techniques after expert testimony.
Woody and Forrest (2009) examined whether jurors were affected by expert testimony
about false evidence ploys in a murder case. They used a 4 (false evidence ploy type) x 2 (expert
witness testimony present vs. not present) design. The false evidence ploys were a bloody fingerprint that was found at the crime scene, an eyewitness that placed the suspect at the scene of the
crime, or an interrogator that stated that the suspect’s face changed when seeing evidence photos.
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One control group was included that did not receive a false evidence ploy. All jurors answered
questions regarding the defendant’s guilt, an appropriate sentence for punishment, and the false
evidence’s (if applicable) degree of deceptiveness and coerciveness. There were no significant
differences between the three false evidence conditions on ratings of defendant guilt, deception,
or coercion, but each differed in the expected direction when compared to the control condition.
Convictions and recommended sentences were not impacted by false evidence, but conviction
rates were lower and recommended sentences were shorter when the expert witness testified.
Woestehoff and Meissener (2016) designed a study manipulating the level of coercion
and type of expert testimony to determine if adding expert testimony would decrease
convictions. Each coercion level included the previous level’s tactics. Under low pressure, the
defendant was encouraged to tell the truth; under medium pressure, the interrogator used
minimization plus a false evidence ploy (e.g., DNA evidence); and under high pressure, the
interrogator threatened the death penalty and physically intimidated the suspect. Participants read
transcripts with general expert testimony on false confessions (e.g., false confession risk factors),
case specific expert testimony on false confessions (i.e., expert testimony specific to this case on
false confessions) or no expert testimony. Participants in the expert testimony conditions were
able to identify more false confession factors than participants in the no expert testimony
conditions, but their verdicts and opinions on guilt were no different. Participants in the lowpressure condition were significantly more likely to convict than those in the medium and high
conditions, as well as the no confession control group, but there were no conviction rate
differences between the medium and high-pressure conditions. This suggests that jurors are able
to distinguish to some degree between various amounts of coercion.

JURORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF FALSE CONFESSIONS

10

Shifton (2019, Study 2) used a 2 (number of interrogators) x 2 (interrogation length) x 2
(suspect wakefulness) design, which yielded 8 conditions (no expert witness testimony). A 9th
condition was added that included expert witness testimony to examine the effects of expert
witness testimony on jurors’ perceptions of evidence strength. All participants read a criminal
trial summary that included evidence (i.e, false confession, eyewitness testimony, and blood
typing). The number of interrogators was either 1 or 3; the interrogation was either 1 or 16 hours
long; and the suspect’s wakefulness was described as either just waking up or just getting off an
8-hour work shift. The expert witness testified on how the defendant’s fatigue, the number of
interrogators, and the length of interrogation may increase the likelihood of a false confession.
Interestingly, mock jurors rated the confession as a stronger piece of guilty evidence when expert
testimony was included. The best predictor of a guilty verdict was the presence of a confession.
A 1-hour interrogation and a rested suspect also predicted a guilty verdict.
In summary, results that examined the effect of expert testimony on verdicts have been
inconsistent. Findings suggest that when an expert testifies about false confessions, jurors
recognize coercive interviewing techniques (e.g., false evidence) (Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2009;
Woody & Forrest, 2009; Woestehoff & Meissener, 2016) and convict less often (Woestehoff &
Meissener, 2016; Shifton, 2019). However, some findings do not show false confession expert
testimony as having a direct effect on convictions. In Woestehoff and Meissener’s (2016) study,
convictions were predicted by pressure level, but not by expert witness presence. Furthermore, in
Shifton (2019) the presence of an expert witness increased the perceived strength of the
confession evidence. The presence of expert witness testimony was however found to reduce
sentencing recommendations (Woody & Forrest, 2009).
The Present Study
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Although previous research has examined jurors’ perceptions of coercive interrogation
techniques and coercive interrogations can be conceptualized as a reason for a false confession,
no studies have compared jurors’ perceptions of an external reason for false confession (i.e.,
coercive interrogation techniques) to an internal reason for false confession (i.e., feeling a panic
attack coming on so the suspect feels the need to escape the room). Therefore, the current study
asked the following questions: Are there differences in jurors’ perceptions of a false confession
when external reasons for a confession (coercive interrogation) are compared to internal reasons
(desire to escape the interrogation room due to anxiety)? Does it make a difference in jurors’
perceptions if an expert witness testifies about how coercive interrogation techniques can lead to
false confessions or how panic disorder can lead a person to confess due to wanting to escape the
interrogation room? To answer questions about the potential impact of an expert witness versus
no expert witness on the outcome variables, the two expert witness conditions were combined.
To answer questions about the potential impact of source, jurors heard the defendant’s stated
reason for falsely confessing plus the expert witness’s testimony confirming that, according to
the research, the defendant’s stated reason can in fact lead to a false confession or heard only the
defendant’s stated reason or only the expert witness’s testimony.
Finally, the study included parallel no false confession conditions as controls to
determine whether the results remain the same as in the false confession conditions (e.g., Do
jurors recognize coercive interrogation techniques when the techniques do not result in a false
confession). The variables that were manipulated were the presence of a false confession by the
defendant, the reason for the false confession, and the confession reason notification source.
These variables produced 12 conditions in a 2 (false confession: present vs. absent) x 2 (reason:
coercive interrogation vs. panic-escape) x 3 (source: expert witness vs. defendant vs. expert
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witness plus defendant) between-subjects design. Outcome variables were the perceptions of the
defendant’s trustworthiness, guilt, suggestibility, and susceptibility to external influences (e.g.,
memory report affected by others). The likelihood of jurors changing their mind on their verdict
of guilt was an additional outcome variable.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
Hypothesis 1: The defendant’s perceived guilt will be lower, suggestibility will be higher, and
susceptibility to external influences will be higher in the False Confession conditions compared
to the No False Confession conditions (i.e., main effect of false confession). This hypothesis was
based on the findings by Woody and Forrest (2009). There was no hypothesis made on jurors’
perceived likelihood of changing their verdict (from guilty or not guilty to the opposite verdict)
given than no studies have included this variable.
Hypothesis 2: In the Coercive Interrogation groups, there will be higher perceived guilt than in
the Panic-escape conditions, higher suggestibility, higher susceptibility to external influences,
and greater likelihood of jurors changing their verdict from guilty to not-guilty vice versa (i.e.,
main effect of reason). This hypothesis was based on the findings by Woody and Forrest (2009).
There was no hypothesis made on defendant’s perceived trustworthiness given that the previous
studies of false confessions cited herein have not included this variable.
Hypothesis 3: In the False Confession present conditions (combined Expert Witness + Defendant
and expert only conditions) guilt ratings will be reduced when an expert witness testifies about
the coerciveness of the interrogation, compared to when an expert witness does not testify about
the coerciveness of the interrogation (i.e., Defendant only condition). In previous studies, mock
jurors were less likely to view the defendant as guilty when an expert witness testified compared
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to when an expert witness did not testify (e.g., Woody & Forrest, 2009; Blandón-Gitlin et al.,
2009).
Hypothesis 4: In the False Confession present conditions, per planned contrasts, the Coercive
Interrogation condition will yield higher guilt ratings than the Panic-escape condition within the
same source (i.e., FC/CI/ExpW vs. FC/PE/ExpW; FC/CI/D vs. FC/PE/D; and FC/CI/ExpW+D
vs. FC/PE/ExpW+D). In Woody and Forrest (2009), participants recognized coercive
interrogating and the current study includes details of a coercive interrogation within the
coercive interrogation scenarios. Furthermore, a panic attack (i.e, Panic-Escape condition) is an
unrecognizable reason for falsely confessing that is unknown to others unless stated by the
defendant.
Research Question 1: Will there be any interaction effects between the confession presence, the
reason, and the source on each of the five outcome variables (i.e., trustworthiness, guilt,
suggestibility, susceptibility to external influences, and likelihood of changing their verdict)?
METHOD
Participants
Participants (N = 415) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The
inclusion criteria of the study were being 18 years old and older, as well as living in the United
States. The number of participants per condition ranged from 26 to 44, which is consistent with
previous jurors’ perception studies (e.g., Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Lynch, Wasarhaley,
Golding, & Simcic, 2013). Table 7 includes the number of participants per condition. An
additional 286 participants were removed for responding incorrectly to attention questions
regarding the trial scenario. The average age of the participants in the current study was 39.4 and
the age range was 19-to-77-years-old. The sample was 55.4% male, 43.9% female, and 0.7%
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non-binary. The sample identified as White (75%), Asian/Asian American (10%), Black/African
American (9%), Hispanic/Latino(a) (6%), Biracial (1.4%), other (0.7%), American
Indian/Indigenous (0.4%), and Pacific Islander (0.2%).
Procedure
The procedure of this study was generally the same as Tessier and Krackow (2013),
Krackow and Longo (2016), as well as Krackow (2018). After viewing the study description on
MTurk, participants enrolled themselves in the study via consenting to participate. They were
then randomly assigned to read one of twelve scenarios reflective of the experimental conditions
(Krackow, 2020). The scenarios pertained to a 25-year-old male on trial for murder. All
scenarios described a couple that went on a camping trip, during which the girlfriend died and
was found in the lake. The boyfriend (i.e., suspect) was then interrogated by the police on two
separate occasions. The suspect’s age (25 years old) was supported by the findings of Drizin and
Leo (2005) showing that young adults are more susceptible to false confessions.
Additional scenario details varied between conditions based on false confession presence,
the reason for the false confession, and the source. When a false confession was present, the
defendant was described as confessing during the second interrogation. The scenario did not state
whether the confession was true or false, but it was in fact false. The reason for the false
confession was either due to the interrogator using coercive interrogation techniques or because
the defendant felt the need to escape the interrogation room. The specific coercive techniques
described were lying about having a witness who identified the suspect in a photo lineup (i.e.,
false evidence ploy). The selection of this coercive interrogation technique was supported by its
frequency and connection to false confession rates (Kassin et al., 2007; Leo & Ofshe, 1997;
Perillo & Kassin, 2010). The defendant’s need to escape was a symptom of a panic attack that
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stemmed from his previous diagnosis of panic disorder (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). The source described why the defendant confessed or almost confessed in the false
confession condition. The sources were an expert witness who testified, the defendant who told
his lawyer, or both the expert witness and defendant.
False Confession: Present. In the false confession present conditions, during an initial
interrogation, the defendant denied committing the crime. During the second interrogation the
defendant confessed to having killed his girlfriend.
False Confession: Absent. In the false confession absent conditions, the defendant denied
committing the crime during the initial and second interrogations.
Reason: Coercive Interrogation Technique. In the coercive interrogation technique conditions,
the interrogator told the defendant that there was an eyewitness that was at the crime scene and
had picked him out of a photo line-up as the murderer. However, the witness and therefore photo
line-up evidence did not exist.
Reason: Panic-escape. In the need to escape conditions, the suspect had a previous diagnosis of
panic disorder and felt a panic attack coming on while in the interrogation room. The panic
attack symptoms (e.g., feeling like he is going to have a heart attack) resulted in the suspect’s
desire to say anything to escape the interrogation room.
Source: Expert Witness Testimony. In the expert witness testimony and coercive interrogation
technique conditions, an expert witness testified that in false confession research, coercive
interrogation techniques have elicited false confessions. The expert witness additionally testified
that the interrogation techniques used were inappropriate. If the expert witness testimony was
present in a condition with the presence of panic-escape, the expert witness stated that the
interrogation techniques used were appropriate. The expert witness then testified that the suspect
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had a panic disorder diagnosis and described the common symptoms (e.g., feeling like a heart
attack is happening). The expert witness continued to testify about the suspect’s rationale for
wanting to escape (i.e., remove himself from the panic attack environment). Lastly, the expert
witness testified that in false confession research, mental health disorders, including anxiety, are
a risk factor for false confessions.
Source: Defendant. In conditions when the defendant was the source, he told his attorney during
their first meeting why he falsely confessed or almost falsely confessed (i.e., was interrogated
with a coercive interrogation technique or was having a panic attack and felt the need to escape).
Source: Expert Witness Testimony plus Defendant. The descriptions from the expert witness
testimony and defendant sources were both provided.
The 12 conditions were:
False Confession/Coercive Interrogation/Expert Witness (i.e., FC/CI/ExpW)
False Confession/Coercive Interrogation/Expert Witness + Defendant (i.e., FC/CI/ExpW+D)
False Confession, Coercive Interrogation, Defendant (i.e., FC/CI/D)
False Confession, Panic-escape, Expert Witness (i.e., FC/PE/ExpW)
False Confession, Panic-escape, Expert Witness + Defendant (i.e., FC/PE/ExpW+D)
False Confession, Panic-escape, Defendant (i.e., FC/PE/D)
No False Confession, Coercive Interrogation, Expert Witness (i.e., NFC/CI/ExpW)
No False Confession, Coercive Interrogation, Expert Witness + Defendant (i.e.,
NFC/CI/ExpW+D)
No False Confession, Coercive Interrogation, Defendant (i.e., NFC/CI/D)
No False Confession, Panic-escape, Expert Witness (i.e., NFC/PE/ExpW)
No False Confession, Panic-escape, Expert Witness + Defendant (i.e., NFC/PE/ExpW+D)
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No False Confession, Panic-escape, Defendant (i.e., NFC/PE/D)
After reading the trial scenario, participants responded to a series of randomized
questions (Krackow & Longo, 2016; Orcutt, Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, 2001; Tessier &
Krackow, 2013; Krackow, 2020). Questions were rated on a Likert-type scale from 1-10 (i.e.,
“not at all” to there is “no doubt in my mind”). Participants in all conditions answered questions
on their perceptions of the defendant’s trustworthiness by answering 1 question (e.g.,
“trustworthy”) and 3 questions regarding guilt (e.g., “guilty?”, “committed the act in question”,
and “responsible for the alleged crime”). Only one indicator of trustworthiness was included in
the current study to ensure that the description of trustworthiness applied to the defendant
regardless of if he falsely confessed or not. Perceptions of the susceptibility to external
influences was asked in 1 question (i.e., “created by the influence of other people?”). Jurors’
perception of their likelihood of changing their mind about their verdict was asked through 2
questions (e.g., “chance of changing their mind” and “likelihood that you would change your
verdict”). Relatedly, suggestibility was asked in 1 question (i.e., “suggestible”). An additional
dichotomous question regarding defendant guilt was asked.
Attention questions were asked pertaining to the scenario, including 1 to 4 specific
questions related to the condition to which the participant was assigned. Participants were then
provided an additional 2 unrelated scenarios, followed by 5 questions total to further determine if
the study was taken seriously (Krackow, 2018). Demographic questions were then asked.
Participants were compensated $2.00 through MTurk after completing the study.
RESULTS
Skew and kurtosis were examined to determine if the data were normally distributed. No
outliers were identified, and a normal distribution was supported. The Levene’s test of
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homogeneity of variance was run on all outcome variables to determine if the homogeneity of
variance assumption was true. Most of the findings were nonsignificant, thereby verifying the
assumption. The mean of the jurors’ perceived likelihood of changing their verdict indicated a
violation (p = .045). However, the median of the jurors’ perceived likelihood of changing their
verdict did not indicate a violation (p = .071).
Defendant Trustworthiness
A 2 (false confession: present vs. absent) x 2 (reason: coercive interrogation vs. panicescape) x 3 (source: expert vs. defendant vs. expert plus defendant) ANOVA was run on
participants’ rating of the defendant’s perceived trustworthiness. See Table 1 for ANOVA
results. A main effect of False Confession presence was found. Jurors in False Confession
present conditions viewed the defendant as less trustworthy than jurors in the No False
Confession conditions. See Table 6 for condition cell means, as well as Table 7 and Table 8 for
interaction means.
A main effect was not found for Reason; jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s trustworthiness
did not differ between the coercive interrogation and panic-escape conditions. A main effect was
also not found for Source; jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s trustworthiness did not differ based
on who (e.g., an expert witness, the defendant, or expert plus defendant) gave the rationale for
why the defendant confessed or considered confessing.
The False Confession Presence x Reason interaction was significant. The defendant who did
not falsely confess was perceived as less trustworthy only when he felt the need to escape as
opposed to when he was interrogated coercively. However, when the defendant did falsely
confess, the defendant was perceived as equally trustworthy when interrogated coercively
compared to when the defendant was portrayed as feeling the need to escape.
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The False Confession presence x Source interaction was non-significant.
The Reason x Source interaction was significant. Simple main effects analyses showed that
there was a main effect of Source in both the Coercive Interrogation condition and in the Panicescape condition. In the Coercive Interrogation condition, there were significant differences per
Tukey post-hoc between the Expert Witness only condition and the Expert Witness plus
Defendant condition, such that trustworthiness was higher when both the expert witness and
defendant were present. A significant difference was also found in the Panic-escape condition
between the Expert Witness only condition and the Expert Witness plus Defendant condition.
However, trustworthiness was higher when only the expert witness testified rather than when
both the expert witness and defendant were present.
The False Confession x Reason x Source interaction effect was non-significant. For
expert witness results on defendant trustworthiness please see page 24.
Defendant Guilt (α= .955)
A 2 (confession: present vs. absent) x 2 (reason: coercive interrogation vs. panic-escape) x 3
(source: expert vs. defendant vs. expert plus defendant) ANOVA was run on the participants’
mean rating of the three questions of the defendant’s perceived guilt. See Table 2 for ANOVA
results. A main effect of False Confession presence was found. Jurors in the False Confession
present condition viewed the defendant as more guilty than jurors in the False Confession absent
conditions. See Table 6 for condition cell means and Table 7 for interaction means.
A main effect of Source was found. A post-hoc Tukey-b analysis with a Bonferroni
correction was conducted to further understand the main effect of source. Jurors viewed the
defendant as less guilty when the expert witness plus defendant testified than when only the
defendant spoke. Jurors also viewed the defendant as less guilty when only the expert witness
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testified than when both an expert witness and the defendant testified. No main effect was found
for Reason.
The False Confession x Reason interaction was significant. In the No False Confession
condition, when the defendant was interrogated coercively, jurors had a lower perception of guilt
than when the defendant felt the need to escape. No such effect was found in the False
Confession condition between the defendant who was interrogated coercively and the defendant
who felt the need to escape.
The False Confession x Source interaction effect was non-significant, as was the Reason x
Source interaction effect. The False Confession x Reason x Source interaction effect was also
non-significant.
Key questions regarding the potential existence of significant differences on the defendant’s
perceived guilt in False Confession only conditions were not addressed by the above analyses.
These questions were addressed by planned contrasts to determine whether there were significant
differences between the coercive interrogation and panic-escape reasons for falsely confessing
within their respective source (e.g., Expert Witness present condition compared to Expert
Witness present condition).
The planned contrast between the false confession/coercive interrogation/expert witness +
defendant condition (M = 6.053, SD = 2.358) and the false confession/panic-escape/expert
witness + defendant condition (M = 4.905, SD = 2.630) showed a marginally significant
difference in jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, but with a moderately small effect size
of d = 0.48 (t(203) = 1.963, p = .051).
The planned contrast between the false confession/coercive interrogation/expert witness
present condition (M = 7.040, SD = 2.402) and the false confession/panic-escape/expert witness
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present condition (M = 6.478, SD = 2.471) showed no significant difference in jurors’
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (t(203) = -.055, p = .956, d = -.012).
The planned contrast between the false confession/coercive interrogation/defendant present
condition (M = 6.398, SD = 2.756) and the false confession/panic-escape/defendant (M = 6.427,
SD = 2.040) showed no significant difference in jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt
(t(203) = 1.198, p = .232, d = .240).
For expert witness results on defendant guilt please see page 24.
Defendant Suggestibility
A 2 (confession: present vs. absent) x 2 (reason: coercive interrogation vs. panic-escape) x 3
(source: expert vs. defendant vs. expert plus defendant) ANOVA was run on the participants’
rating of the defendant’s perceived suggestibility. See Table 3 for ANOVA results. A main effect
of False Confession presence was found. When a false confession was present, the defendant was
viewed as more suggestible than when there was no false confession present. The main effect for
Reason was non-significant. See Table 6 for condition cell means and Table 7 for interaction
means.
A main effect of Source was found. A post-hoc Tukey-b analysis with a Bonferroni
correction showed that the presence of expert witness testimony led to higher ratings of
suggestibility by jurors. When the defendant or an expert witness plus the defendant explained
the reason for the false confession or almost confession, the defendant was perceived as more
suggestible than when only the expert witness explained the reason. There were no statistically
significant differences between the Defendant only condition and the Expert Witness plus
Defendant condition.
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The False Confession presence x Reason interaction was significant. In the no False
Confession condition, jurors viewed the coercively interrogated defendant as less suggestible
than the defendant who wanted to escape. There was no statistical difference in the False
Confession condition when the defendant was interrogated coercively and when the defendant
felt the need to escape.
The False Confession presence x Source interaction was non-significant as was the
Reason x Source interaction. The False Confession x Reason x Source interaction effect was also
non-significant. For expert witness results on defendant suggestibility please see page 24.
Defendant Susceptibility to External Influences
A 2 (reason: coercive interrogation vs. panic-escape) x 3 (source: expert vs. defendant vs.
expert plus defendant) ANOVA was run on participants’ rating of the defendant’s perceived
susceptibility to external influences in the false confession conditions only. This analysis is based
on 191 participants because the remaining participants did not respond to this question. See
Table 4 for ANOVA results. As a reminder, susceptibility to external influences (coercive
questioning by the police) only applied to the False Confession Conditions. A main effect of
Reason was not found. See Table 6 for condition cell means.
A main effect of Source was found, such that the presence of an expert witness plus the
defendant led to higher susceptibility to external influences ratings than when only the expert
witness testified about their reason for falsely confessing.
The Reason x Source interaction was non-significant. For expert witness results on
defendant susceptibility to external influences please see page 24.
Likelihood of Changing Verdict
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A 2 (false confession: present vs. absent) x 2 (reason: coercive interrogation vs. panicescape) x 3 (source: expert vs. defendant vs. expert plus defendant) ANOVA was run on
participants’ mean rating of the likelihood of changing their verdict. See Table 5 for ANOVA
results. A main effect of False Confession presence was not found. See Table 6 for condition cell
means and Table 7 for interaction means.
A main effect of Reason was found; jurors were more likely to change their verdict if the
defendant felt the need to escape compared to if the defendant experienced a coercive
interrogation.
A main effect of Source was found. The presence of the defendant only led to jurors being
more likely to change their verdict compared to when only the expert witness testified. There
were no statistically significant differences between the presence of an expert witness versus
both an expert witness plus defendant on jurors’ likelihood of changing their verdict. There were
no statistically significant differences between the presence of only an expert witness and only
the defendant.
The False Confession presence x Reason interaction was significant. More specifically, in
the No False Confession conditions, jurors had a higher likelihood of changing their verdict from
guilty to not guilty or vice versa when the defendant felt the need to escape than when the
defendant was interrogated coercively. In the False Confession Conditions, this effect was
nonsignificant, such that the defendant’s suggestibility was not different when the defendant felt
the need to escape than when he was interrogated coercively.
The False Confession Presence x Source interaction was non-significant as was the Reason x
Source interaction. The False Confession x Reason x Source interaction effect was also non-
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significant. For expert witness results on jurors’ likelihood of changing their verdict please see
page 24.
Expert Witness Results
It is important to determine whether expert witness testimony compared to no expert witness
testimony had an impact on the outcome variables. To answer these questions, the two expert
witness conditions were combined and a series of 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAS was conducted. There
were main effects of expert witness presence on jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (p
=.004), suggestibility (p = .051), and likelihood of changing verdict (p = .039). Guilt ratings were
lower when an expert witness testified (M = 4.841, SE = .136) compared to when they did not (M
= 5.483, SE = .177). Suggestibility ratings were also lower when an expert witness testified (M =
5.264, SE = .136) compared to when they did not (M = 6.166, SE = .176). Jurors’ ratings of the
likelihood of changing their verdict were lower with the presence of an expert witness (M =
3.464, SE = .124) compared to no expert witness (M = 3.886, SE = .162). Ratings of defendant
trustworthiness were non-significant (p = .054) when the expert witness was present (M = 5.155,
SE = .128) and absent (M = 5.110, SE = .166). Ratings of the defendant’s susceptibility to
external influences did not differ (p = .803) between expert witness presence (M = 5.765, SE =
.227) and absence (M = 5.855, SE = .282) (based on 414 participants due to 1 participant’s
failure to answer all questions which was discovered late in the analytic process). The False
Confession x Expert Witness, Reason x Expert Witness, and False Confession x Reason x Expert
Witness interactions were non-significant.
Discussion
When the defendant falsely confessed, jurors viewed him as more guilty, as
hypothesized, and less trustworthy than when no false confession was given. This finding
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regarding guilt disappeared when the false confession/coercive interrogation conditions were
compared to the false confession/panic-escape conditions when the source remained constant.
Interestingly, jurors only viewed coercive interrogating as being detrimental in the No False
Confession conditions. In the False Confession condition, jurors viewed coercive interrogation to
be an equally plausible reason for confession as wanting to escape the interrogation room due to
the onset of a panic attack. This last finding held regardless of whether the reason for confession
was provide by the defendant themselves or the expert witness, or the defendant plus expert
witness.
As expected, jurors also recognized that the defendant was more suggestible when he
falsely confessed. However, given that suggestibility to false confession and external influences
relate to one another in the false confession conditions, jurors should have also recognized that
the defendant who was coercively interrogated (i.e., external influence) was more susceptible to
external influences than the defendant who felt the need to escape (i.e., internal influence). It is
unknown why there were unable to do so.
Across conditions, jurors were comfortable with their verdict on the defendant’s guilt.
They were not very likely to change their verdict one way or another. When the defendant did
not falsely confess and felt the need to escape, jurors were more open to changing their verdict.
Expert witness testimony regarding false confessions or thoughts of falsely confessing
decreased jurors’ perceptions of guilt and suggestibility and rendered jurors more likely to
change their minds about the verdict. This is consistent with previous findings that the
recognition of coercive interrogation techniques increases after an expert witness testifies and
therefore guilty verdicts decrease after an expert witness testifies (Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2009;
Woody & Forrest, 2009).
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Results of analyses with respect to the impact of the three sources on the dependent
variables showed no clear pattern. For example, sometimes hearing why the defendant
confessed/almost confessed seemed to have a negative impact on jurors’ ratings. Future research
should continue to examine this issue to gain a better picture of these findings.
Limitations
One limitation of this study was the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit participants.
Participants were recruited online and completed the study without any in-person interactions.
The lack of in-person contact sets the current study apart from criminal trials as they typically
occur. Therefore, the results obtained may not generalize to in person criminal trials. Participants
acted as mock jurors but did so online and without deliberating with other mock jurors. Also,
participants predominantly identified their race as Caucasian. It is unknown whether these results
would generalize to different racial or ethnic populations, given possible differences with police
experiences.
The present study’s purpose was to learn about mock jurors’ perceptions of false
confessions. The trial scenarios consistently described the defendant as a 25-year-old male. As a
result, the findings may not generalize to defendants of different ages and genders. The
defendant’s race was not included in the trial scenarios to prevent this information from
influencing the results.
A true confession was not included because the study focused on false confessions.
Furthermore, additional conditions would have increased the complexity of the current study.
Nonetheless, true confession conditions can be beneficial comparison groups.
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The avenues differed by which the defendant and expert witness (i.e., source) used to
inform the jury of why a false confession was likely, which may be a limitation. In the trial
scenarios, the defendant told his lawyer why he falsely confessed or considered falsely
confessing (e.g., coercive interrogation). The lawyer then told this information to the jury.
However, the expert witness testified in front of the jury as to why the defendant likely confessed
or considered confessing. These means differed to best represent what occurs in a criminal trial.
Defendants rarely take the stand when on trial for murder (Bellin, 2018). Finally, the current
manuscript only includes results from continuous measurements of guilt, despite categorical data
also being collected. This information is not included because the logistic regression analysis
would not run properly.
Future Directions
Studies in the future should aim to decrease the limitations presented. For instance, this
study may be replicated in a real courtroom and/or with jurors who deliberate with one another.
These changes will make the study more realistic. The defendant’s characteristics, such as age,
race, and gender should also be varied to increase the generalizability. The present study used
false evidence as a coercive interrogation technique. Future studies should include different
coercive interrogation techniques or a combination of techniques. The inclusion of other
techniques will increase the understanding of jurors’ perceptions of false confessions when a
defendant has been interrogated coercively.
Conclusion
The results of the current study suggest that jurors are more likely to believe that
someone who falsely confessed is guilty, possibly because jurors in the current study did not
understand why the defendant falsely confessed. Expert witness testimony was helpful in
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reducing guilt ratings regardless of whether the defendant falsely confessed or almost falsely
confessed but decided against doing so. Jurors did not view the defendant as more guilty if the
reason for false confession was coercive interrogation or wanting to escape the interrogation
room due to the onset of a panic attack.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Errors, and Univariate Analyses of Variance for Defendant Trustworthiness
M
SE
df
F
P-value
ηp2
False Confession

1, 404

51.813

.000***

.114

1, 404

1.054

.305

.003

2, 404

2.968

.053

.015

False Confession x Reason

1, 404

8.761

.003**

.021

False Confession x Source

2, 404

.048

.953

.000

Reason x Source

2, 404

5.584

.004**

.027

False Confession x Reason

2, 404

1.885

.153

.009

Present

4.683a

.141

Absent

6.130b

.143

Reason
Coercive Interviewing

5.510

.137

Panic-escape

5.304

.147

Source
Expert + Defendant

5.655a

.179

Expert

5.480a

.162

Defendant

5.086b

.180

x Source
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different
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Table 2
Means, Standard Errors, and Univariate Analyses of Variance for Defendant Guilt
M
SE
df
F
P-value
False Confession

ηp2

1, 404

119.572

.000***

.229

1, 404

.043

.837

.000

2, 404

12.785

.000***

.060

False Confession x Reason

1, 404

8.224

.004**

.020

False Confession x Source

2, 404

1.657

.192

.008

Reason x Source

2, 404

.246

.782

.001

False Confession x Reason

2, 404

1.305

.272

.006

Present

6.214a

.149

Absent

3.890b

.151

Reason
Coercive Interviewing

5.030

.144

Panic-escape

5.074

.156

Source
Expert + Defendant

4.290a

.190

Expert

5.372b

.190

Defendant

5.495b

.172

x Source
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different
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Table 3
Means, Standard Errors, and Univariate Analyses of Variance for Defendant Suggestibility
M
SE
df
F
P-value
ηp2
False Confession

1, 404

14.517

.000***

.035

1, 404

3.446

.064

.008

2, 404

8.861

.000***

.042

False Confession x Reason

1, 404

10.340

.001***

.020

False Confession x Source

2, 404

2.249

.107

.011

Reason x Source

2, 404

.246

.676

.002

False Confession x Reason

2, 404

.266

.767

.001

Present

6.218a

.150

Absent

5.402b

.153

Reason
Coercive Interviewing

5.611

.146

Panic-escape

6.009

.157

Source
Expert + Defendant

6.099a

.191

Expert

5.166b

.192

Defendant

6.165a

.173

x Source
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different
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Table 4
Means, Standard Errors, and Univariate Analyses of Variance for Defendant Susceptibility of
External Influences
M
SE
df
F
P-value
ηp2
Reason
Coercive Interviewing

5.948

.243

Panic-escape

5.658

.253

Source
Expert + Defendant

6.413a

.325

Expert

5.223b

.310

Defendant

5.762

.274

Reason x Source

1, 192

.682

.410

.004

2, 192

3.447

.034*

.036

2, 192

.611

.517

.007

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different
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Table 5
Means, Standard Errors, and Univariate Analyses of Variance for Jurors’ Likelihood of
Changing Their Verdict on Guilt
M
SE
df
F
P-value
ηp2
False Confession

1, 404

3.052

.081

.008

1, 404

4.072

.044*

.010

2, 404

3.155

.044*

.015

False Confession x Reason

1, 404

5.048

.025*

.012

False Confession x

2, 404

.988

.373

.005

Reason x Source

2, 404

.868

.421

.004

False Confession x Reason

2, 404

.341

.711

.002

Present

3.779

.139

Absent

3.432

.142

Reason
Coercive Interviewing

3.405a

.134

Panic-escape

3.805b

.146

Source
Expert + Defendant

3.553

.178

Expert

3.338a

.177

Defendant

3.925b

.160

Source

x Source
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for all Outcome Variables
(n = 38)
(n = 41)
(n = 30)*
(n = 39)*
FC/CI/ExpW+D

FC/CI/D

(n = 33)
(n = 30)*

(n = 28)
(n = 25)*

(n = 39)
(n = 38)*

(n = 30)
(n = 29)*

FC/CI/ExpW

FC/P/ExpW+D

FC/P/D

FC/P/ExpW

Guilt

M
6.053

SD
2.358

M
6.398

SD
2.276

M
7.040

SD
2.401

M
4.905

SD
2.629

M
6.427

SD
2.040

M
6.468

SD
2.741

Trustworthiness

4.080

2.045

4.150

2.116

5.240

2.332

5.710

2.447

4.560

2.150

4.330

1.882

Suggestibility

6.660

2.134

6.460

2.357

5.970

2.494

6.790

2.114

6.080

1.628

5.230

1.977

Susceptibility to

6. 267

2.612

6.077

2.454

5.500

2.688

6.560

2.678

5.447

1.672

5.035

2.383

3.961

2.015

4.110

2.981

3.333

1.685

3.893

2.485

3.923

2.181

3.367

1.925

External Influences*
Likelihood of Changing
Verdict
(n = 40)

(n = 41)

(n = 30)

NFC/CI/ExpW+D

NFC/CI/D

NFC/CI/ExpW

(n = 26)
(n = 25)**

(n = 35)

(n = 33)

NFC/P/D

NFC/P/ExpW

NFC/P/ExpW+D

Guilt

M
2.675

SD
1.564

M
4.382

SD
1.802

M
3.633

SD
2.166

M
3.525

SD
1.784

M
4.771

SD
1.936

M
4.353

SD
2.234

Trustworthiness

6.750

1.676

5.980

1.695

6.870

1.833

6.080

1.573

5.660

2.326

5.450

2.063

Suggestibility

4.880

2.015

5.630

1.959

4.070

2.638

6.080

1.853

6.490

2.188

5.270

2.349

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2.600

1.846

3.695

1.955

2.733

1.799

3.760

1.763

3.971

2.156

3.833

1.195

Susceptibility to
External Influences
Likelihood of Changing
Verdict**
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for False Confession x Reason Interaction
False Confession

False Confession x

No False Confession

No False Confession

x Coercion

Panic-escape

x Coercion

x Panic-escape

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

Guilt

6.470

.225

6.003

.241

3.565

.190

4.280

.206

Trustworthiness

4.446

.208

4.827

.223

6.495

.180

5.702

.195

Suggestibility

6.384

.205

6.051

.219

4.937

.211

5.947

.230

Likelihood of

3.830

.200

3.765

.214

3.041

.178

3.866

.195

Changing Verdict
Note: Only variables with significant findings are included in this table.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Reason x Source Interaction
Coercive Interview
Coercive
Coercive

Trustworthiness

x Expert +

Interview

Interview x

Defendant

x Defendant

Expert

Panic-escape
x Expert +
Defendant

Panic-escape
x Defendant

Panic-escape
x Expert

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

M

SE

5.449

.251

6.016

.279

5.061

.245

5.889

.291

4.922

.267

5.081

.249

Note: Only variables with significant findings are included in this table.

